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T he increasing influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) constitutes a significant development in contemporary international 
law. This development, however, does not seem to have been a dramatic 
departure from the past, for a recent study traces NGO influence on 
international governance to the late eighteenth century; it suggests a cyclical 
pattern in the participation ofNGOs in international lawmaking-emergence 
(1775-1918), engagement (1919-1934), disengagement (1935-1944), 
formalization (1945-1949), underachievement (1950-1971), intensification 
(1972-1991), and empowerment (1992-1).1 . 
It is widely acknowledged that the "intensification" period began with NGO 
participation in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm; continued at the 1974 and 1984 UN World 
Population Conferences in Bucharest and Mexico City, the 1974 UN World 
Food Conference in Rome, the 1925 and 1985 UN Women's Conferences in 
Mexico City and Nairobi, and the 1976 UN Habitat Conference in Vancouver; 
and culminated with the UN World Summit for Children in New York in 1990. 
The "empowerment" era began with the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which attracted over 
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650 NGOs. A special NGO forum was convened, and NGOs were able to 
influence governments in the process of negotiations that resulted in the Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Global Climate and Biodiversity 
Conventions.2 
Ever since that time, the expanding role ofNGOs in reaching international 
decision makers has become a normal feature of the international landscape. 
Thus, it is a valid assertion that in the recent past NGOs have played a growing 
role in influencing policy makers. This trend is reflected in the involvement of 
NGOs in World Bank decisions on development projects. NGO 
representatives have participated both directly and indirectly in multilateral 
negotiations on critical issues-human rights, environment, and trade,3 for 
example. On the regional level, NGOs have been engaged in the process of 
shaping human rights.4 The term "civil society" perhaps better captures the 
essence of what these organizations are and what they do better than 
"nongovernmental organization," which has come under criticism as 
inadequately descriptive of their work.5 
In the Vienna Declaration Programme of Action, adopted at the Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights in 1993,6 the contribution ofNGOs was 
especially acknowledged: 
The World Conference on Human Rights recognizes the important role of 
non-governmental organizations in the promotion of all human rights and in 
humanitarian activities at national, regional and international levels. The World 
Conference on Human Rights appreciates their contribution to increasing public 
awareness of human rights issues, to the conduct of education, training and 
research in this field, and to the promotion and protection of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. While recognizing that the primary responsibility for 
standard-setting lies with States, the Conference also appreciates the 
contribution of non-governmental organizations to this process. In this respect, 
the World Conference on Human Rights emphasizes the importance of 
continued dialogue and cooperation between governments and 
non-governmental organizations.7 
Two recent examples of the extent of NGO influence in international 
decision making are the World Court Project and the NGO Coalition for an 
International Criminal Court. The World Court Project was an international 
citizens' initiative to obtain an advisory opinion from the International Court 
of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Officially 
launched in 1992 by three international nongovernmental organizations, the 
initiative was aimed at influencing decision makers at the World Health 
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Organization (\VHO) and the United Nations General Assembly to make the 
necessary request of the Court, since citizens groups are not allowed by the 
rules of the Court to seek such an opinion.8 The Project succeeded; both the 
\VHO and the General Assembly made requests. The second example, the 
NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, has successfully coalesced 
the efforts of a number of grassroots organizations and "like,minded" 
governments all over the world toward the establishment of an international 
criminal court.9 
The purpose of this chapter is to study how NGOs, including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) , were instrumental in 
influencing policy makers on two particular issues-blinding laser weapons and 
antipersonnel landmines. Thus the discussion will focus on NGO 
contributions toward the development of international humanitarian law on 
these topics. It should be noted that the body of international humanitarian 
law of armed conflict primarily consists of the series of Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907,10 the four Geneva Conventions of 194911 and their two 
Protocols of 1977,12 and the 1980 Conventional \Veapons ConventionY 
The role of the ICRC in the formation, application, and monitoring of 
international humanitarian law is too well known to need any documentation, 
but I will begin with a summary of the Red Cross movement and of the 
development of international humanitarian law (with special emphasis on the 
role of the ICRC) in order to provide the appropriate historical context for an 
appreciation of the role of NGOs in the development of norms related to 
blinding laser weapons and landmines. 
The JCRC and International Humanitarian Law 
The Red Cross movement began in the 1860s as a response to the 
publication of Henry Dunant's A Memory of Soiferino, which recounted the 
dreadful experience of thousands of wounded soldiers in the aftermath of the 
June 1859 battle of Solferino in northern Italy during the wars of Italian 
independence. 14 \Vith four citizens of Geneva, Dunant set up the International 
Standing Committee for Aid to the Wounded Soldiers, which subsequently 
became the International Committee of the Red CrosS.15 The movement today 
consists of several national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, founded by 
the ICRC, which cooperate with the ICRC but are independent entities: the 
International Conference of the Red Cross; the League of Red Cross Societies; 
and the Research and Teaching Center of the International Red Cross, known 
as the Henry Dunant Institute. 
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The ICRC succeeded in persuading the Swiss government to convene in 
1864 an international diplomatic conference, in which twelve States were 
represented, that resulted in the signing of the 1864 Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.16 
Under the treaty, ambulances and military hospitals were "recognized as 
neutral, and as such, protected and respected by the belligerents as long as they 
accommodate wounded and sickj" hospital and ambulance personnel had "the 
benefit of the same neutrality when on duty, and while there remain any 
wounded to be brought in and assistedj" "wounded and sick combatants, to 
whatever nation they belong, shall be collected and cared forj" and "hospitals, 
ambulances and evacuation parties" were distinguished by a uniform flag 
bearing "a red cross on a white ground."l? 
Subsequently, a treaty concluded in 1899 made applicable the principles of 
the 1864 treaty to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at seaj the 1864 and 
1899 treaties were later revised in 1906 and 1907, respectively.IS In 1920, the 
ICRC sent a letter to the League of Nations Assembly urging that asphyxiating 
gases be banned.19 In 1929, after the experience of the First World War, it took 
the initiative and convened a diplomatic conference in Geneva at the 
invitation of the Swiss Government to adopt a much improved treaty on the 
treatment of the wounded and sick on landj it also negotiated a separate 
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.20 
The tragedies of the Spanish Civil War and World War II led the ICRC to 
initiate moves further to revise and develop the earlier conventions. The Swiss 
government called another diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1949, the 
result of which was the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, for whose 
monitoring and application the ICRC was made responsible. 
The ICRC's primary role pertaining to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is to 
help wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces and also 
prisoners of war. Its delegates visit places of detention, internment, and work 
where there are captive personSj delegates approach the detaining power 
where appropriate and inspect the living quarters, treatment, and food of the 
captivesj and they work toward improving the captives' conditions. In enemy 
territory or occupied areas, the ICRC acts on behalf of civilian populations. 
Under Article 3, common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, it also 
functions as a neutral intermediary in non,international armed conflicts. In 
such conflicts, the parties are bound to apply enumerated fundamental 
principles. The ICRC's Central Tracing Agency searches for missing persons 
and exchanges family messages between people separated by armed conflict. In 
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addition, the ICRC may be called upon to provide relief such as food, medicine, 
and clothing for civilian populations suffering from war. 
The ICRC's initial purpose of providing care for sick and injured soldiers in 
war has remained intact. The range and scope of the ICRC's functions, 
however, have expanded considerably. To illustrate, under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions the ICRC is given the special task of supervising trials of 
prisoners of war in case the protecting power, a neutral State that protects 
prisoners of war, cannot exercise these functions. As Article 10 of the 
Convention on Prisoners of War provides, if the belligerent powers cannot 
agree on a neutral State to serve as the protecting power, "the Detaining Power 
shall request or shall accept ... the offer of the services of a humanitarian 
organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume 
the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present 
Convention."2l 
The Geneva Conventions especially mandate that signatory parties 
recognize and respect at all times the special position of the ICRC in its 
humanitarian activities of providing relief shipments to civilian internees and 
inhabitants of occupied territories.22 
The ICRC has been vigilant in ensuring that revisions and further 
developments of the existing international humanitarian law instruments take 
place when they become necessary. Thus, in 1955 and 1956 it proposed draft 
rules for the protection of civilian populations against the effects of war. Its 
1956 proposals included a ban on "weapons whose harmful effects, which 
resulted in particular from the dissemination of incendiary, chemical, 
bacteriological, radioactive or other agents, could spread to an unforeseen 
degree or escape ... from the control of those who employ them .... 1123 But 
because of the Cold War, the proposed rules did not receive serious 
consideration.24 
Subsequently, in 1965, the ICRC undertook to study the possible revisions 
to the 1949 Conventions at the 20th International Conference of the Red 
Cross, held in Vienna in 1965.25 The Conference adopted a resolution 
enumerating the following principles: 
• That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited. 
• That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as 
such. 
• That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in 
the hostilities and members of the civilian population, to the effect that the 
latter be spared as much as possible. 
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• That the general principles of the law of war apply to nuclear and similar 
weapons.Z6 
It is also important to note that on 19 December 1968 the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution inviting the Secretary,General to carry out 
studies for the revision of earlier conventions on international humanitarian 
law "in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross."Z7 
The resolution was in response to a resolution adopted at the International 
Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in April,May 1968 requesting the 
General Assembly to invite the Secretary,General to study steps "to secure the 
better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and 
rules in all armed conflicts" and to inquire into the "need for additional 
international humanitarian conventions or for possible revision of existing 
Conventions to ensure the better protection for civilians, prisoners of war and 
combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use 
of certain methods and means of warfare."zs 
In 1969, the participants at the 21st International Red Cross Conference at 
IstanbuF9 officially requested the organization to undertake the task of revising 
and updating the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the ICRC legal staff initiated 
the preparatory work. Consultations between governments and Red Cross 
Societies under the auspices of the ICRC continued from 1971 to 1974. In 
February 1974 the government of Switzerland, which is the depository State of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, convened a diplomatic conference to discuss 
the draft protocols prepared by the ICRC. 
The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts met in yearly 
sessions from 1974 to 1977. The United Nations, governments, and the ICRC 
participated, and the draft texts prepared by the ICRC formed the basis of 
deliberations and negotiations and eventually the final text that emerged. At 
the end of the fourth session, on 8 June 1977, delegates of 102 States adopted 
Protocol I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, and Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non,International Armed Conflicts.3o 
At the Diplomatic Conference, deliberations also began on imposing 
possible restrictions or prohibitions on the use of certain conventional 
weapons, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons, mines, or booby traps, 
but no conclusion was reached on this subject. Thus, the United Nations 
convened a special conference to address these issues. The Special Conference 
met in two sessions, the first in 1979 and the second in 1980. On 10 October 
1980, it adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
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Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (the Weapons Convention), with 
three annexed protocols:31 Protocol I, the Non,Detectable Fragments 
Protocol; Protocol II, the Mines Protocol; and Protocol III, the Incendiary 
Weapons Protocol. These Protocols regulate the use of particular types of 
conventional weapons considered to pose special risks of unnecessary suffering 
or indiscriminate effects. 
The role of the ICRC in disseminating the content of international 
humanitarian law is also impressive. Its target groups have been primarily 
armed forces and combatants, national Red Cross and Red Crescent personnel, 
civil servants in government ministries, the academic community, primary and 
secondary school systems, medical professionals, journalists and the media, and 
the public.32 
Even a summary review of international humanitarian law must include 
other important developments in which the ICRC was not a major player. At 
the outset, it should be noted that on 24 April 1863, during the Civil War, the 
U.S. War Department published General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Popularly known as 
the Lieber Code (after Francis Lieber, who prepared the historic document), it 
established detailed rules on land warfare for the U.S. Army.33 Then the 1868 
Declaration of St. Petersburg was adopted as a treaty Renouncing the Use in 
Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight.34 
Subsequently, another important development was the Hague Convention 
of 1899 with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed 
regulations and a preamble, which included the Martens Clause (named after 
its author, the Russian delegate de Martens).35 Under this clause the parties, 
recognizing that they had not solved all problems, explained that it was not 
their intention "that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written 
undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders." Thus, 
in such unforeseen cases, both civilians and combatants would "remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and the dictates of the public conscience."36 
In addition, in 1907 the Second Hague Peace Conference addressed 
questions of naval warfare and adopted conventions on this subject. Among 
other selected significant developments were: a naval conference held in 
London two years later, which adopted a Declaration Concerning the Laws of 
Naval War;37 the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
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Warfare,38 adopted in 1925 under the auspices of the League of Nationsi and 
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict,39 adopted under the auspices of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
The Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol 
Two NGOs, the ICRC and Human Rights Watch, were instrumental in 
mounting a campaign which resulted in the adoption of the Blinding Laser 
Weapons Protocol annexed to the Conventional Weapons Convention.40 An 
international review convention, begun in 1994, was aimed at particularly 
strengthening the Mines Protocol, earlier adopted in 1980.41 However, because 
of the work done by these NGOs, it also considered the question of adopting a 
new protocol on blinding laser weapons. In May 1996 the international review 
process concluded with the adoption of an amended mines protocol and a new 
Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.42 (The Protocol's provisions will be 
discussed below, as will the contributions of the ICRC and Human Rights 
Watch toward its adoption.) 
Article 1 of Protocol IV prohibits the employment of "laser weapons 
specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat 
functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the 
naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Under this article, 
the transfer of any such weapon to any State or entity is prohibited. 
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported that "[a]lthough the 
prospect of mass blinding was an impetus for the adoption of the Protocol, it 
was not the intent of the Conference to prohibit only mass blinding. 
Accordingly, under both the Blinding Laser Protocol and Department of 
Defense policy, laser weapons designed specifically to cause such permanent 
blindness may not be used against an individual enemy combatant.,,43 
Under Article 2, the parties are obligated to "take all feasible precautions to 
avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision" in the 
employment of laser systems other than those described in Article 1. The 
article adds that "[s]uch precautions shall include training of their armed 
forces and other practical measures." According to Secretary Christopher, this 
requirement is "also fully consistent with the policy of the Department of 
Defense which is to reduce, through training and doctrine, inadvertent injuries 
from the use oflasers designed for other purposes, such as target 
discrimination, and communications."44 
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Article 3 provides that "[b]linding as an incidental or collateral effect of the 
legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used 
against optical equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol." 
Commenting on this article, Secretary Christopher said that it "reflects a 
recognition of the inevitability of eye injury as the result of lawful battlefield 
laser use. It is an important measure in avoiding war crimes allegations where 
injury occurs from legitimate laser uses."4s 
Article 4 defines permanent blindness as "irreversible and uncorrectible loss 
of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious 
disability is equivalent to visual acuity ofless than 20/200 Snellen measured in 
both eyes." According to the Secretary of State, this definition is "of sufficient 
precision to prevent misuse or misunderstanding of the term [permanent 
blindness] which is a critical element of Article 1. It is also consistent with 
widely accepted ophthalmological standards."46 
Under the procedures contained in the Weapons Convention, this Protocol 
will enter into force six months after twenty States have notified their consent 
to be bound. The scope of the Protocol is limited to the scope of the 
Convention, which extends it to international armed conflicts and to internal 
conflicts for "national liberation." 
The ICRC had addressed the issue of antipersonnel laser weapons at an 
experts meeting in 1973; many specialists considered the cost of the use of such 
devices to outweigh their benefits and thus were of the opinion that their use 
would be unlikely.47 
Subsequently, at Government Experts Conferences convened by the ICRC 
in Lucerne (September,October 1974)48 and Lagano Oanuary,February 
1976),49 the discussion on antipersonnel laser weapons occurred in the context 
of deliberations on the developments of future weapons and possible 
restrictions on specific weapons.so Several participating experts stated their 
assessment that the development of such weapons was "unlikely in the near 
future."s1 However, the ICRC again addressed the subject at four experts 
meetings that it convened specifically on battlefield laser weapons between 
1989 and 1991.52 Sweden and Switzerland, among other nations, had raised 
the issue at the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross and were keen 
to undertake efforts to ban blinding laser weapons. 
In the Prologue to the reports of the experts meetings, ICRC President 
Cornelio Sommaruga said that the ICRC was concerned with the effects of 
these weapons because of its goal to alleviate the suffering caused by armed 
conflicts, and that the attempt was to "supervise developments so that States 
may take suitable preventive action."s3 In his words; "Given today's rapid 
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technological developments, the widespread proliferation of weapons and the 
continued eruption of numerous armed conflicts, it is clear that weapons 
developments need to be supervised in order to try to prevent the conflicts of 
tomorrow wreaking even more suffering than those of today."s4 
Participants at these meetings included, in addition to experts on 
international humanitarian law, specialists in laser technology, psychiatry, 
ophthalmology, and military medicine. After deliberations on a wide range 
of aspects of the possible military use of laser technology and its physical, 
psychological, and medical ramifications, the discussions centered on legal 
and policy implications of the use of such weapons and whether the causing 
of permanent blindness was in violation ofinternational humanitarian law. 
The ICRC concluded that blinding was more severe and debilitating than 
most other war injuries. Battlefield stress and post,traumatic stress 
syndrome were both determined to occur more frequently in persons 
blinded in battle.55 
At the conclusion of the April 1991 meeting, several regulatory measures 
aimed at prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons were identified.56 
Subsequently the ICRC stated that blinding as a method of warfare "is a 
superfluous injury and a cause of unnecessary suffering, both of which are 
prohibited under existing international humanitarian law."57 It vigorously 
advocated the banning of blinding laser weapons. 
Human Rights Watch was also active in undertaking studies and generating 
public support to ban blinding laser weapons. In May 1995 it published a report 
on U.S. blinding,laser weapons.58 After an overview of tactical laser weapons 
and of the status of U.S. and foreign tactical laser weapons programs, Human 
Rights Watch recommended that "parties to the 1980 Conventional Weapons 
Convention should adopt a new protocol at the September 1995 Review 
Conference which would prohibit blinding as a method of warfare and ban 
blinding tactical laser weapons."S9 
In September 1995, Human Rights Watch published another study, Blinding 
Laser Weapons-The Need to Ban a Cruel and Inhumane Weapon.60 It analyzed 
the development of tactical laser weapons programs in the United States and 
China,61 especially noting the Chinese ZM,87 portable Laser Disturber, 
weighing seventy,three pounds and capable of transmitting a beam at several 
wavelengths.62 The Chinese effort to market the ZM,87,63 designed specifically 
to injure eyesight, was a matter of serious concern and could not have gone 




The study also discussed legal and humanitarian considerations, specifically 
the prohibition against unnecessary suffering and superfluous .injury and the 
need to balance military necessity against humanitarian considerations, 
suggesting that 
[pJublic opinion might be more negatively affected by large numbers of blind 
than large numbers of dead, because the blind "would remain in view and be 
distressful for society." Furthermore, the use of weapons designed to produce 
extreme handicaps or excessive damage have always produced unnecessary 
strain on peace negotiations, later peaceful relations between nations no longer 
at war, and societal infrastructure. Consequences to society are an important' 
political factor in deciding whether to ban a particular weapon.64 
The Human Rights Watch study analyzed the language of the Draft Protocol, 
which was originally proposed by Sweden, and recommended strengthening 
it.6S It also urged that blinding as a method of warfare be prohibited.66 
A detailed discussion of the application of international humanitarian law 
to blinding laser weapons-what constitutes "unnecessary suffering" and 
"superfluous injury," the concept of proportionality, "military necessity," and 
the Martens Clause is beyond the scope of this paper.67 Similarly, how to 
construe Protocol W, an admittedly important issue, will n<;>t be discussed 
here.6s Nor will I review the pros and cons of the assertion that blinding as a 
method of warfare should have'been prohibited, as suggested by the ICRC and 
Human Rights Watch. The Protocol only prohibits the employment of "laser 
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their 
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness." 
The pertinent point to be, stressed here is that these" human rights 
organizations had a powerful impact upon parties to the Review Conference 
and were able to persuade them that in the application of international 
humanitarian law the social costs involved in weapons designed to cause 
blindness should be especially taken into account, and that blinding laser 
weapons should be banned. 
As noted earlier, the United States was eventually convinced of the need to 
ban blinding laser weapons. Thus, in transmitting the on Blinding 
Laser \Veapons to the Senate for advice and consent, President William J. 
Clinton said on 7 January 1997 that "[t]hese blinding lasers are not needed by 
our military forces. They are potential weapons for the future, and the United 
States is committed to preventing their emergence and use. The United States 
supports the adoption of this new Protocol.,,69 
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The Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines 
A treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti,Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction,70 was signed in Ottawa, Canada, on December 
3,4, 1997.71 The Convention was adopted in Oslo in September 1997 and will 
come into force six months after forty States have ratified it.72 The UN 
Secretary,General is designated as the Convention's depository.13 The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, comprising several NGOs, including 
the ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 
and Physicians for Human Rights, was instrumental in mounting a successful 
campaign which culminated in the adoption of the Convention.74 
This section will first note the pertinent provisions of the Landmines 
Convention and will then look briefly at the two earlier efforts, Protocol II of 
the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its amended version 
adopted by the Review Conference of that Convention in 1996. The 
concluding part will discuss the role ofNGOs. 
The Provisions of the Landmines Convention. As the title of the Landmines 
Convention suggests, the treaty prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines and mandates their destruction. In its 
preamble, States parties stressed "the role of public conscience in furthering 
the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of 
anti,personnel mines and recogniz[ed] the efforts to that end undertaken by 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non,governmental 
organizations around the world." They also 
[based] themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the 
right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is 
not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts 
of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction 
must be made between civilians and combatants. 
Under the Convention, States parties undertake never under any circumstances: 
a) To use anti,personnellandminesj 
348 
VedNanda 
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; 
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.75 
Parties undertake within four years "to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all stockpiled anti-personnel mines" that they own or possess, or that are under 
their jurisdiction or controU6 Moreover, they undertake to destroy all 
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 
ten yearsj77 to make every effort to identify, mark, and ensure the safety of 
landmine areaSj 7S and to seek extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of antipersonnel mines for a period up to ten years.79 The decision 
on extension is to be made according to set criteria and procedures.so 
Consistent with earlier definitions of landmines in Protocol II and revised 
Protocol II, an antipersonnel mine is defined as one "designed to be exploded 
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, 
injure, or kill one or more persons."S! 
The Convention contains detailed proviSions on international cooperation 
and assistance. To illustrate, States parties undertake 
to facilitate and ... participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
material, and scientific and technological information concerning the 
implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue 
restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related 
technological information for humanitarian purposes.82 
They are also to provide assistance for mine victims and a mine-awareness 
program,S3 as well as mine clearance and related activities through the UN 
system, international or regional organizations, NGOs, or bilaterally, or by 
contributing to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for assistance in mine clearance 
or other regional funds set up for demining.84 In addition, they are to provide 
assistance for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines.8S 
Within six months of the Convention's entry into force, States parties are to 
report to the UN Secretary-General their national legal, administrative, and 
other measures, including penal sanctions, taken to implement the 
Convention within their jurisdiction or controlj86 the total number of all 
stocked antipersonnel mines and the status of programs for their destructionj 
and the types and quantities of the mines destroyed since the entry into force of 
the Convention.S7 Such information is to be annually updated and reported.s8 
Among other pertinent provisions, the Secretary-General is to convene the 
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first meeting of the States parties within one year after the Convention's entry 
into force,89 to be followed by annual meetings until the first Review 
Conference, five years after the entry into force of the Convention.90 NOOs 
may be invited as observers.9l 
The Convention outlines amendment procedures, requiring a majority of 
the of the States parties present and voting.92 It provides for NOO 
attendance at amendment conferences as well, 93 for consultation and 
cooperation among States parties, and the use of the good offices of the 
meeting of the States parties as the means for settlement of disputes. The 
Convention also sets forth detailed provisions on facilitation and clarification 
of compliance,94 prohibits reservations,95 and requires a notice 
period for a State's withdrawal.96 
Though it is a document compared with the earlier 
attempts(as will be discussed below), one weakness of the Convention is that 
the enforcement provisions are not very effective. Similarly, its applicability to 
actors should perhaps have been strengthened. However, to allow 
negotiations on the prohibitions of specific weapons to succeed, some 
compromises had to be made. 
Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As mentioned 
earlier, Protocol II of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention was an 
attempt to regulate antipersonnellandmines in aid of the Convention's major 
purpose of prohibiting the deployment and use of weapons which cause 
unnecessary suffering, especially to noncombatant civilians.97 It did not 
succeed in prohibiting landmines, and the regulations it established were weak, 
lacking provisions for implementation and enforcement.98 
The definition oflandmines under the Protocol was similar to the one now 
contained in the 1997 Landmines Convention-"any munition placed under, 
on or near the ground ... and designed to be detonated ... by the presence, 
proximity, or contact of a person."99 Also prohibited was the use of mines or 
booby traps "in all circumstances ... in offense, defense or by way of reprisals, 
against the civilian population ... or against individual civilians."loo 
The indiscriminate use of conventional weapons that are not directed against 
a military objective, or which use delivery methods that cannot be directed at 
specific military targets, or that when employed "may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated" were outlawed.10l Additionally, use of 
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such weapons in areas of civilian concentration was prohibited when combat 
has ceased in those areas or does not appear imminent.l02 
A major deficiency in the Protocol was that combatants were not to be liable 
if they issued appropriate warnings or cordoned the areas of deployment from 
civilian access. l03 Furthermore, the purpose of protecting civilians was never 
accomplished, although the Protocol did contain some safeguards, such as 
requiring the recording and publication of locations of antipersonnel mine 
deployment and the taking of precautions to protect civilians from the "effects 
of minefields, mines, and booby traps,,,l04 providing for international 
cooperation in the removal of such weapons, 105 and recording the location of 
the buried conventional weapons. 
Thus, at the request of States parties to the Conventional Weapons 
Convention, the United Nations convened a conference to review the 
provisions of the Convention, especially its Protocol II, the Landmine Protocol, 
which met in the fall of 1995 and resumed sessions in January and April,May 
1996.106 It should be noted that the General Assembly invited interested 
NGOs, especially the ICRC, to attend the Conference.l07 
Although the amended Protocol II did not ban antipersonnel landmines, 
the prior Protocol was strengthened through an agreement among the 
participants to impose stricter restrictions on the use, export, and production of 
these weapons. lOS The scope of its application was expanded to include internal 
conflicts, albeit with some limitations. 109 Among general restrictions, 
provisions concerning effective advance warnings and parties' responsibilities 
were added.11°Thus, each party to a conflict is responsible for landmines placed 
by it and for their clearance, removal, destruction, or maintenance under the 
terms contained in the amended Protocol.l11 The terms are contained in 
Article 10. The use of certain mines, such as self,deactivating mines, equipped 
with an anti,handling device designed to make the mine capable of exploding 
after the mine ceases to function, is also prohibited,112 as are mines with 
mechanisms specifically designed to detonate in the presence of commonly 
available mine detectorsll3 and also nondetectible mines, unless their use is in 
compliance with the Technical Annex (2).114 
The amended Protocol contained restrictions on the use of antipersonnel 
mines other than remotely delivered mines,115 on the use of remotely delivered 
mines,116 and on the transfer of mines.ll7 It also contained provisions on 
recording and publication requirements for landmines, expanding the earlier 
requirements under the 1980 Protocol II.11s States parties are now required to 
clear, remove, destroy, or maintain all minefields, mined areas, and mines.119 
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Among other provisions included in the amended Protocol II are those on 
technical cooperation and assistance,120 and those for protection of all forces or 
missions from the effects of mines in any area under the parties' control.121 States 
parties have also agreed on compliance procedures and consultation measures.122 
Although the amended Protocol II strengthened the provisions of the 1980 
Protocol II by regulating, in addition to previous limits on their use, mine 
transfers, and production, there was concern over the effectiveness of these 
regulations. The requirements that mines be manufactured with 
and devices reduce the risk of accidental 
detonation by a failure in the process, but the exceptions to the 
requirements still present risks. 
Furthermore, the major defect in the 1980 Protocol II, relating to the 
indiscriminate effect of landmines, remained unresolved in that amended 
Protocol II allowed the use or transfer of existing mines other than 
nondetectible mines (which did not have to be removed for another nine years 
if a party could not immediately comply with the requirement to include a 
detectable mechanism in mines produced before January 1, 1997).123 
Enforcement mechanisms also remain deficient. For these reasons, the effort 
was begun to draft a convention to prohibit landmines. 
The NGO Contribution. Perhaps on no other issue of public concern have 
NGOs achieved so spectacular a success as on the issue of banning landmines. 
Several studies by NGOs, especially Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, 124 
Landmines-Friend or Foe?l25 and several reports on the impact 
oflandmines in specific countries (such as Angola, 126 Cambodia, 127 El Salvador, 
and Nicaragua12S and Iraq), 129 were instrumental in educating the public about 
the nature and gravity of the problem caused by landmines. Thus, this work set 
the stage for the Review Conference and-because of the NGOs' 
persistence-led to the eventual prohibition of antipersonnel landmines by 
adoption of the Landmines Convention in December 1997. 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which began operating in 
1991 and comprised 250 groups, coordinated NGO activities.130 In 1992, the 
Campaign issued a joint call for an international ban,131 and by 1993 it had 
been joined by representative NGOs from several countries. Ultimately, the 
campaign "succeeded over fourteen months in persuading countries to join a 
major international treaty, a process that usually takes years."m 
Canada provided leadership in what became known as the Ottawa Process. 
In October 1996 the Canadian government gathered representatives from 
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countries and asked them to return to Ottawa in December 
1997 to sign an agreement to ban antipersonnel mines by the year 2000.133 
The Conference held a "Mine Action Forum" and produced an Agenda for 
Mine Action, and the United Nations Development Programme announced 
that it envisages setting up "mine action centers" in poor countries where 
development is impeded because of scattered mines.134 At the signing 
conference, government representatives and NGO experts discussed its next 
step, the Ottawa Process II, an initiative to obtain international commitment 
to furthering mine clearance, victim assistance, and rehabilitation.135 
The demining process is extremely expensive, costing up to a thousand dollars 
per mine for removal, compared to the procedure for laying the mines in the first 
place. To address this financial obstacle, the United States announced it will 
host an international demining donor conference in May 1998; nearly $400 
million has already been donated by Norway, Japan, Canada, and the European 
Commission, among others, to aid in the work over the next five years.136 
Conclusion 
Nongovernmental organizations have played a significant role in the efforts 
to ban blinding laser weapons and antipersonnellandmines. In educating the 
public on the crisis caused by these inhumane weapons and in influencing 
decision makers in many countries to agree upon conventions to prohibit these 
weapons, NGOs were and continue to be instrumental in ensuring that 
established legal tradition in which the use, production, stockpiling, and export 
of unjustifiably inhumane weapons is prohibited applies explicitly to these two 
weapons as well. 
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